

## Multilateral Approach in India's Foreign Policy: The Case of Relations with Latin America<sup>1</sup>

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### Abstract

*India's successful Group of 20 (G20) presidency in 2023 has drawn attention to the country's foreign policy approach in the face of growing great power polarization and the crisis of multilateralism. New Delhi seeks to engage all centres of power and reach out to as many multilateral groupings as possible, while continuing its cautious balancing act in global affairs. Additionally, India is positioning itself as a bridge between East and West, a responsible power capable of providing development assistance to needy countries and acting as a "voice of the global South."*

*The author argues that the policy of multi-alignment and the positioning as a vishwa mitra (friend of the world) are intended to enable India to achieve a new status in the system of global governance. The study of official documents and literature has shown that New Delhi's key imperative in this path is to maintain its independence of decision-making, while the main challenge is to address the potential discontent on the part of foreign partners with the opportunistic nature of Indian approaches. The article deciphers India's policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), a region that has not previously been a priority for Indian foreign policy. The author identifies four aspects of India's approach to expanding its presence in LAC: strengthening ties with specific states (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico); promoting economic projects in sectors with competitive advantages for Indian companies; developing contacts with regional integration associations (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Central American Integration System (SICA), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)) and interaction in multilateral formats (G20, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and others), IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), and the Group of 4 (G4)); and exploiting cultural and historical ties and the influence of the diaspora. The growing engagement with the LAC region is a manifestation of India's more ambitious identity and its intention to make the transition from a "balancing power to a leading power."*

**Keywords:** multilateralism, India, multi-alignment, Latin America, foreign policy, G20, BRICS, Brazil

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### Introduction

The academic debate on the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation has been revived in recent years by a number of changes in the international system: the foreign policy moves of former US President Donald Trump, the growing rivalry between the US and China, the COVID-19 pandemic, and armed conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The inability of international organisations to respond to these challenges and the growing confrontation in the relations of major powers have led to renewed talk of a crisis of multilateralism.

This is not the first time that multilateralism has faced a period of instability: the bloc nature of the bipolar world during the Cold War and the period of US dominance after its end also were not conducive to an inclusive world order and the achievement of common goals for all states. In this respect, a dichotomy of crisis and sustainability of multilateral cooperation can be observed.

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On the one hand, the growing disagreements both in the relations between the leading powers and along “global North – global South” and “West – East” fault lines are paralysing international institutions and turning multilateralism into a hostage of contradictions between its participants. On the other hand, the increased interdependence resulting from globalisation and the lack of answers to global problems such as climate change, sustainable development, migration, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, issues of regulating artificial intelligence, etc., require the preservation of formats of international interaction. A number of authors have noted that instead of constantly thinking in terms of the “crisis-normality” dichotomy, crises should be integrated as permanent components of multilateralism [Guilbaud, Petiteville and Ramel, 2023, p. 2-4].

India has a dual approach to multilateral cooperation. On the one hand, New Delhi sees its participation in international organisations and groupings as an enhancement of its international status in global processes; on the other hand, it is increasingly critical of the system of global governance and, as part of groups of states (BRICS, IBSA, Group of Four, etc.), is seeking to reform international institutions and gain access to the decision-making mechanism (first and foremost, to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council).

The aim of this article is to identify the peculiarities of India’s foreign policy approach to multilateralism and to demonstrate its manifestations through the example of developing relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. This study relies on the constructivist school of international relations as a theoretical framework to examine national identity, the internal and systemic factors that influence it, and the perception of the country’s place in the international system. In addition to general scientific methods employed, the article applies critical discourse analysis, which allows to identify the specifics of the construction of political reality by focusing on the linguistic and social components of discourse. This method was applied to the analysis of the Indian government documents and statements by the country’s top officials in order to interpret the ideas and terms that fill New Delhi’s foreign policy discourse. The use of a case study approach revealed new elements in India’s global positioning and approach to multilateral groupings as manifested in its engagement with the LAC region.

### **The “multi-alignment” concept in India’s foreign policy**

Indian identity has been shaped since independence in 1947 by a number of principles drawn from the colonial experience: non-violence (*ahimsa*), economic self-reliance (*swadeshi*), achieving full independence (*purna swaraj*), a policy of non-alignment and positive neutrality [Ogden, 2023, p. 4]. Historical memory has influenced not only India’s foreign policy but also its approach to multilateralism. Former Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh noted that “years of colonial subjecthood” are reflected in “excessive Indian touchiness”, so that “underlying Indian positions

in some international economic negotiations has been a [historically rooted] fear of foreign economic looting” [Malone, 2011, p. 271].

The ascension of the Narendra Modi government in 2014 marked a pivotal juncture in the evolution of India’s foreign policy. S. Jaishankar, a prominent Indian diplomat, who has held the position of foreign secretary and subsequently external affairs minister, articulated New Delhi’s newly defined aspirations in international affairs in 2015, emphasising its “greater confidence”, its intention to move from a “balancing power” to “leading power”, and its readiness “to shoulder greater global responsibilities” [Ministry of External Affairs, 2015]. Despite the change of ruling elites and the emergence of a ‘New India’ vision, New Delhi’s core foreign policy imperatives have remained unchanged: to gain influence and status in the world while maintaining autonomy and independent decision-making [Ogden, 2023, p. 5].

In the mid-2000s, the expert discussion began to consider potential changes in India’s approach to international affairs, including the gradual abandonment of the non-alignment policy. C. Raja Mohan and P. Khanna were among the first to highlight that India had begun to pursue a foreign policy “premised on its central position, permitting multidirectional engagement – or “multi-alignment” – with all major powers and seeking leverage from East Africa to Pacific Asia” [Mohan, Khanna, 2006].

The primary criticism of the policy of non-alignment was India’s staying on the sidelines of pivotal global processes. Consequently, the transition to an active stance in the form of “pragmatic” multi-alignment, as proposed by the renowned Indian strategist B. Chellaney, was deemed a better alternative to a “passive” non-alignment [Chellaney, 2021, p. 22].

Shashi Tharoor, an authoritative Indian politician and thinker, believed that “multi-alignment” was an effective response to new challenges to which neither autonomy nor alliance could provide adequate answers. His vision of the concept included the following elements:

- 1) participation in all kinds of multilateral forums;
- 2) exempting no country from the foreign policy “embrace”;
- 3) making common cause with countries regardless of their political regime;
- 4) making and running shifting coalitions of interests [Tharoor, 2012, p. 426–427].

I. Hall, an eminent researcher of India’s foreign policy, notes that multi-alignment was manifested in New Delhi’s practice as early as during the years of the United Progressive Alliance government (2004-2014) led by Manmohan Singh and contained three aspects. The first aspect involved joining and actively participating in new global and regional multilateral institutions and forums. The second aspect involved the conclusion of strategic partnership agreements and the deepening of relations developed under previous governments. Finally, the third aspect, the so-called ‘normative hedging’, was New Delhi’s seriousness about ‘normative power’ – “the power

to shape what is considered normal and acceptable” in international relations [Hall, 2016, p. 278-279] – while maintaining a degree of scepticism towards the promotion of Western norms and Western dominance in global governance.

Despite a substantial continuity in New Delhi’s foreign policy, the concept of multi-alignment has recently become a more frequent topic of discussion in the speeches of senior officials. According to S. Jaishankar, this policy involves “engaging all major centres of power [and] reflects the realities of multipolarity” [Ministry of External Affairs, 2023b]. In his book, the minister observed that multi-alignment represents a more energetic and participative approach compared to the previously practiced “posture of abstention or non-involvement”. However, in his view, the difficulty lies in the perception that the new approach is opportunistic, despite the fact that India is seeking strategic convergence rather than tactical convenience [Jaishankar, 2020].

One of the challenges facing the Modi government is the differing interpretations of “multi-alignment” by foreign partners and reproaches for a lack of commitment to the interests and ideas that other countries seek to uphold [Hall, 2016, p. 283]. Conversely, it can be argued that the ability to preserve multiple options and to work in multilateral institutions and groupings with distinct agendas represents a significant strength of India’s policies.


During the Indian election campaign gaining momentum in late 2023 and early 2024, the Indian government has presented a new vision for the country’s role in global affairs. In his address, Prime Minister Modi declared that India is becoming a “friend of the world” (*vishwa mitra*). This designation encompasses a number of attributes, including “a partner who can be trusted, a voice that believes in the global good, an engine of growth in the global economy, a technological hub, a powerhouse of talented youth, and a democracy that delivers” [Press Information Bureau, 2024b]. Ministry of External Affairs asserts that the role of a “friend of the world” is contingent upon India’s capacity and willingness to engage with a broad range of nations and, when necessary, to harmonize the interests of disparate groupings [Ministry of External Affairs, 2023a], which largely aligns with the tenets of the multi-alignment policy.

### **India’s Foreign Policy and Multilateralism**

One of the most notable aspects of India’s foreign policy under the Modi government is its active participation in a wide range of multilateral forums, which often have distinct agendas. New Delhi’s multilateral diplomacy is evidenced by its membership of various international organisations and groupings, including the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa), SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), Quad (India-Australia-Japan-US), I2U2 (India-Israel-UAE-US) and numerous trilateral forums (See Figure 1 and Table 1). This position in New Delhi is regarded as an affirmation of the India’s special place in the system of international relations

and a course of action that will enable it to achieve its global ambitions. Indian observer S. Haidar suggests that as part of “hedging”, India fights for its unique brand of multi-alignment or “all-alignment” with partners worldwide, without having to choose between them [Haidar, 2022].

*Figure 1. The Venn diagram illustrating India’s position in relation to multilateral formats with opposing agendas. The diagram was compiled by the author.*



As a member of numerous multilateral formats, India persists in maintaining its independent course. This is evidenced by India’s refusal to join financial sanctions against Russia imposed by the United States and other Western countries. Despite the strained relationship between New Delhi and Beijing, India refrains from making anti-China statements at Quad meetings with the US, Australia, and Japan. India has emphasised its “non-Western identity”, while indicating a lack of alignment with the anti-Western agenda in BRICS and SCO, and has expressed a desire to avoid impeding its growing ties to the US and EU [Chellaney, 2021, p. 22].

While India supports multilateralism as fundamental to the maintenance of global order, in recent years it has highlighted resistance to reforming multilateral institutions, particularly the UN and its bodies, as a major impediment to their effectiveness [Ministry of External Affairs, 2023b].

A novel phenomenon has emerged in the form of New Delhi’s intensified engagement with minilateral formats, which are both regionally and thematically circumscribed. Among the recently established mechanisms are the India-Australia-Indonesia, India-Australia-France, India-France-UAE, and India-Armenia-Iran trilateral forums (See Table 1). Minilateral groupings are distinguished by a relatively small number of participants (typically three or four), more informal meetings, and a greater lack of institutionalisation than multilateral mechanisms. In general, these formats originate at the “Track II” level and, as evidenced by practice, do not always reach the highest level.

*Table 1. Trilateral formats with India's participation*

<b>Format</b>	<b>Year of Establishment</b>	<b>Levels of Engagement</b>	<b>Current Status</b>
India-China-Russia	2001	Leaders, foreign ministers, national security advisers, ministry representatives, business forum, track II	Interaction suspended from 2022 onwards
India-Brazil-South Africa	2003	Leaders, foreign ministers, national security advisers, naval exercises, track II	Functioning
India-Japan-US	2011	Leaders, foreign ministers, ministry representatives, naval exercises, track II	Interaction suspended from 2020 onwards
India-Australia-Japan	2015	Leaders, foreign ministers, trade ministers, diplomatic representatives	Functioning
India-Australia-Indonesia	2017	Foreign ministers, diplomatic and trade representatives, naval exercises, track II	Functioning
India-Australia-France	2020	Foreign ministers, diplomatic representatives, track II	Functioning
India-Italy-Japan	2021	Diplomatic representatives	Functioning
India-France-UAE	2022	Foreign ministers, diplomatic representatives, air force exercises	Functioning
India-Armenia-Iran	2023	Diplomatic representatives	Functioning

Minilateral groupings with Indian participation exhibit several distinctive features related to the specifics of New Delhi's foreign policy. Firstly, the formats established in recent years have a certain geographical focus, with many of them discussing processes in specific parts of the Indo-Pacific region. For instance, the India-UAE-France troika's discussions are focused on the countries' area of common interest, namely the western Indian Ocean. Secondly, for India, which avoids closed alliances, the flexibility of the emerging structures and the absence of strict commitments of their participants remain important aspects. The establishment of trilateral formats with the "middle powers" indicates the Indian government's intention to remain unbound by the US-led system and to retain the freedom of action necessary to determine the trajectory of

development of these groups [Mohan, 2023]. Finally, the discussions with New Delhi's participation have concentrated on specific thematic issues and have not permitted any ideological or value-based cooperation.

It appears that the Indian approach to multilateral and minilateral mechanisms is most clearly exemplified by the evolution of the Quad. S. Jaishankar, the Head of Indian diplomacy, identifies five components that define the importance of this grouping for Indian foreign policy:

- 1) The growth of a multipolar order;
- 2) The emergence of a post-alliance and post-Cold War thinking;
- 3) A focus against spheres of influence;
- 4) Democratisation of the global space and an orientation towards cooperative, not unilateral, approach;
- 5) A statement that "others cannot have a veto on our choices" [Ministry of External Affairs, 2024].

### **India's Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean**

The LAC represents an intriguing case study for Indian foreign policy and its multilateral approach, despite the fact that the region has not been a priority for New Delhi. During the tenure of the Modi government, particularly during the second term (2019-2024), India's approach to the region has been characterised by dynamism and a willingness to expand both political and economic ties with regional partners. New Delhi's intentions are reflected in the visits of senior Indian diplomats to the region. In a two-year period, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visited eight countries in the region. His visit to Mexico in September 2021 was followed by the visits to Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay in August 2022, and Guyana, Colombia, Panama and the Dominican Republic in April 2023. One of his deputies, Minister of State for External Affairs Meenakshi Lekhi, undertook visits to Panama, Honduras and Chile in 2022 and Cuba, Guatemala, El Salvador and Bolivia in 2023.

Three distinct levels of Indian policy in Latin America and the Caribbean can be identified: bilateral, regional and multilateral. In the context of India's *bilateral* relations with the countries of the region, the nature of its engagement with Brazil, Argentina and Mexico is particularly noteworthy. The relations between India and Brazil, and India and Argentina are officially designated as "strategic partnerships", whereas the relationship between India and Mexico holds the status of a "privileged partnership". It seems probable that the latter designation will be upgraded to a more elevated level in the near future. While the total trade with the region in the 2022/2023 fiscal year was \$39.6 billion, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina accounted for 77 per cent of this figure [Ministry of Commerce and Industry, n.d.].



Brazil represents New Delhi's most significant partner in terms of trade, economic and political cooperation. The trade turnover between the two countries exceeds \$16 billion. Of India's total investment in the Latin American and Caribbean region, which is estimated to be between \$15 and \$16 billion, Brazil accounts for approximately \$6 billion. In comparison, the FDI of all regional countries in India is about \$2 billion, of which Brazil accounts for approximately \$1 billion. In 2003, India and Brazil signed a defence cooperation agreement, and since 2010, they have had a joint defence committee. Moreover, the two states engage in regular interactions within various international groupings, including BRICS, IBSA, BASIC, G20, G4, L.69, where they advocate for the reform of global institutions and the increased representation of developing countries within them [Embassy of India in Brasilia, 2024].

It is paradoxical that, despite the common challenges faced by the countries and similar identities manifested in interactions in multilateral arenas, India remains poorly understood by both Brazilian scholars and policy makers. Brazilian expert O. Stuenkel posits that Brazil's India policy is not primarily based on accurate country-specific information, but rather on vague images and concepts such as South-South cooperation. As a result, Brazil's strategy towards India is characterised by high-profile statements and meetings of high-level officials, though it is not evident that Brazil is able or willing to engage New Delhi in a long-lasting and meaningful partnership [Stuenkel, 2012].

It is important to note that, in accordance with the principles of the "multi-alignment" policy, India has been fostering ties with partners in Latin America irrespective of the political regime in power in the country. The strengthening of India-Brazil cooperation since the early 2000s has not been influenced by domestic political changes in Brazil. Following the return to power of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, there has been an expansion of political-diplomatic contacts and increased military-technical cooperation. In early 2024, the two sides held their first meeting of defence and foreign ministers (in a two-plus-two format) and a dialogue on military-industrial cooperation. The most significant agreement in this area was the agreement between Mahindra and Embraer on the purchase of C-390 Millennium military transport aircraft for the Indian Air Force, with the possibility of developing joint production [Pubby, 2024].

The ascension of President Javier Milei to power in Argentina did not affect India's relations with that country. Two significant items on the bilateral agenda have gained momentum. Indian state-owned company KABIL has concluded a contract with Argentina's CAMYEN for a five-year project to explore and develop five lithium blocks [Press Information Bureau, 2024a]. The agreement is part of India's strategy to gain access to critical minerals in resource-rich countries in the region (a similar lithium mining agreement is being negotiated with Bolivia). Furthermore, India and Argentina have continued discussions regarding the supply of Indian-made aircraft,



particularly the fourth-generation Tejas light fighter. Despite competition from the United States and China, the Indian manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics Limited remains a contender for the contract [Sanchez, 2024].

The diaspora factor plays a significant role in India's relations with the Caribbean. The aggregate population of Indian origin people residing in Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname exceeds one million. They are typically the descendants of contract labourers who were dispatched to the region by the British authorities between 1837 and 1917 to work on sugar cane plantations. Many of them are unaware of the circumstances of their ancestors' migration, but have retained some of the customs of their historical homeland, adherence to religion (Hinduism and Islam) and extensive family ties [Roopnarine, 2018, p. 144]. Indian descendants occupy a number of prominent positions in the public service in Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, which presents further opportunities for the development of political ties. In 2021 and 2023, respectively, the Indian-origin President of Suriname, Chandrikapersad Santokhi, and the President of Guyana, Mohammed Irfaan Ali, were bestowed with the highest honours conferred by the Government of India on overseas Indians. During their respective tenures, the number of official meetings increased markedly, and statements about a shared "motherland" and "deep cultural and historical ties" became the basis for building relations [Zakharov, 2023, p. 126-127].

India's interactions with *regional* integration groupings have exhibited a degree of volatility. In addition to New Delhi's own unstable attention to the LAC region, several features of Latin American regionalism in recent years are worthy of note. These include the crisis in associations such as UNASUR (The Union of South American Nations) and ALBA (The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), the polarisation in CELAC (The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), the revision of the integration strategy in MERCOSUR (The Southern Common Market), and processes of foreign policy restructuring in the countries of the region [Tayar, 2021, p. 417].

Nevertheless, New Delhi is currently resuming previously frozen contacts [Parulekar, 2019]. In September 2022, the dialogue mechanism between India and CELAC (which brings together 33 countries in the region) was reactivated after a five-year hiatus. A meeting was held on the margins of the UN General Assembly between the Indian External Affairs Minister and representatives of four countries of the grouping: the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Vice-President for Multilateral Affairs of Colombia. On matters of global concern, both parties reaffirmed their intention to collaborate on UN reform and climate change. With regard to more immediate concerns, India put forth a proposal for the CELAC countries to share its experience in information technology and digitalisation [Bhardwaj, 2022]. In addition, the President of India, Draupadi Murmu, was invited to address the grouping's summit

in January 2023. It is notable that the intensification of India's diplomatic engagement with CELAC occurred during the year of Argentina's presidency and coincided with the expansion of bilateral cooperation between New Delhi and Buenos Aires.

During his tour of the region in 2023, S. Jaishankar participated in the two mechanisms: the India-Central American Integration System (SICA) in Panama and the India-Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in Guyana. The India-SICA talks resulted in the establishment of working groups on energy, tourism, pharmaceuticals and women's rights. The minister invited CARICOM countries to set up small and medium-sized enterprises and expressed willingness to provide grants for individual projects as well as equipment, technology and training [High Commission of India in Georgetown, 2023].

New Delhi has been an observer in the Pacific Alliance (PA), a regional initiative of Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico, established in 2012. Despite India's status as an observer since 2014, its engagement with the PA has been intermittent and largely ceremonial in nature. Relations with individual member countries are developing more favourably. To illustrate, Indian investments in the economies of Mexico and Colombia amount to \$3 billion and \$1 billion, respectively. For India, Peru is an important supplier of gold and minerals, ores and their concentrates, ferrous metals and rare earths, which collectively account for nearly 85 per cent of bilateral trade. Colombia represents the second largest market for Indian motorcycles in South America, with sales volume reaching approximately 600 thousand units per year [Vorotnikova, 2023, p. 113].

A preferential free trade agreement between India and Mercosur has been in place since 2009. The agreement is rather limited in scope, as it covers only a small part of bilateral trade (452 product categories), includes a small reduction in import duties and excludes investment, trade in services and people-to-people links. Since then, India has not entered into any FTAs with regional partners, although negotiations are underway to renew the agreement with Chile<sup>2</sup> and conclude a new one with Peru.

*Multilateral* cooperation is becoming an increasingly important aspect of India's regional policy. During the COVID-19 pandemic, India sought to demonstrate its status as the "world's pharmacy" by providing vaccines to countries in need. Some of these supplies were provided on a commercial basis to economically developed countries, while the remainder were made available through grants and the World Health Organization's COVAX program. In Latin America and the Caribbean, India shipped approximately 9 million doses of vaccine to 21 countries in the region.

New Delhi is engaged in collaboration with UN regional programmes. The \$150 million India-UN Development Partnership Fund, established in 2017, has the objective of supporting

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<sup>2</sup> This refers to the extension of the preferential agreement with Chile reached in 2007.

developing countries. Since its inception, the fund has implemented sustainable development projects in 14 LAC countries. In addition, India-Latin America Business Conclaves have been held regularly since 2007 with the support of the UN ECLAC Commission. The recent conclave took place in New Delhi in August 2023 and was attended by over 200 participants, including 17 ministers from 11 countries of the region.

During its 2023 G20 presidency, India has sought to reinforce its diplomatic ties with developing countries, including those in Latin America. A key objective of New Delhi's engagement with LAC countries was to convey its willingness to represent their interests at the G20 level. It is noteworthy that during his interaction with CARICOM counterparts, S. Jaishankar stated that India intended to use "the privilege of chairing the G20" not only for itself but also for countries outside the grouping [High Commission of India in Georgetown, 2023]. In order to demonstrate its status as an informal leader of the developing world, India hosted two "Voice of the Global South" summits in 2023, which were attended by 125 countries, including 29 from Latin America and the Caribbean.

## **Conclusion**

The multilateral approach in India's foreign policy is reflected in the concept of 'multi-alignment'. India pursues a multi-pronged foreign policy and seeks to establish mutually beneficial relations with all centres of power, while avoiding entanglement in the strategic interests and conflicts of other states and any situation that could jeopardise the preservation of autonomy and independent decision-making. The success of this approach allows New Delhi to promote the idea of India becoming a "leading power" and a "friend of the world", taking a special place in the global system and declaring ambitions to raise its status in international organisations. The continued economic development of India and its growing influence in international affairs would appear to encourage further conceptualisation of foreign policy and the implementation of new initiatives that highlight the country's unique achievements.

India's chairmanship of the G20 in 2023 has demonstrated New Delhi's ability to utilise multilateral formats to achieve its foreign policy goals and its intention to position itself as a "voice" and informal leader of the global South.

The development of ties with Latin America and the Caribbean is a manifestation of India's new, more ambitious, identity, which includes projecting the global reach of its foreign policy objectives. A rethink of India's approach to the region is underway, with a view to expanding bilateral, regional and multilateral ties. Four aspects of New Delhi's LAC policy can be distinguished: 1) the strengthening of partnerships with individual states, with a particular focus on Brazil, Argentina and Mexico; 2) the promotion of economic projects in sectors where Indian

companies have competitive advantages or in areas of strategic interest to India; 3) the development of contacts with regional integration groupings and cooperation in multilateral formats; and 4) the capitalisation on cultural and historical ties and the influence of the diaspora.

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